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We develop a model of asset price bubbles based on the communication process between advisors
and investors. Advisors are well-intentioned and want to maximize the welfare of their advisees (like
a parent treats a child). But only some advisors understand the new technology (the tech-savvies);
others do not and can only make a downward-biased recommendation (the old-fogies). While smart
investors recognize the heterogeneity in advisors, naive ones mistakenly take whatever is said at face
value. Tech-savvies inflate their forecasts to signal that they are not old-fogies, since more accurate
information about their type improves the welfare of investors in the future. A bubble arises for a wide
range of parameters, and its size is maximized when there is a mix of smart and naive investors in
the economy. Our model suggests an alternative source for stock over-valuation in addition to investor
overreaction to news and sell-side bias.
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wxiong@princeton.edu“To be against what is new is not to be modern. Not to be modern is to write
yourself out of the scene. Not to be in the scene is to be nowhere.” Tom Wolfe,
The Painted Word
1. Introduction
What are the origins of speculative asset price bubbles? This question remains unanswered
despite a large and growing literature on speculative trading and asset price bubbles in
economics. Motivated in part by the behavior of internet stocks during the late nineties, a
surge in new research has arrived at two conclusions. The ﬁrst is that diﬀerences of opinion
among investors and short sales constraints are suﬃcient to generate a price bubble.1 The
second is that once a bubble begins, it is diﬃcult for smart money to eliminate the mispricing
(i.e. there are limits of arbitrage).2 All these studies take as given that investors disagree
about asset values. But where does this divergence of opinion come from?
In this paper, we develop a model of the origins of bubbles. Two sets of stylized facts
motivate our analysis. The ﬁrst is that asset price bubbles tend to occur during periods of
excitement about new technologies.3 In the U.S., speculative episodes have coincided with the
following major technological breakthroughs: (1) railroads, (2) electricity, (3) automobiles,
(4) radio, (5) micro-electronics, (6) personal computers, (7) biotechnology, and most recently
(8) the Internet.4 The second is that in the aftermath of the Internet bubble, the media and
regulators placed much of the blame on biased advisors for manipulating the expectations
of naive investors. While not directly related to the Internet experience, indirect evidence
from academic research in support of this view held by the media and regulators include:
(1) analyst incentives to generate biased, optimistic forecasts; (2) naive individual investors
who do not recognize that these biased recommendations are motivated by incentives to sell
1See, e.g., Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), and Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003). Extensive empirical work conﬁrming this premise include Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002),
Lamont and Thaler (2003), and Ofek and Richardson (2003). This literature stands in contrast to the rational
bubble literature (see, e.g., Blanchard and Watson, 1982) in which these two ingredients are not crucial in
an inﬁnite horizon setting. However, Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) show that these two ingredients
emerge as relevant again to generate a rational bubble in a ﬁnite horizon setting.
2See, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
3See, e.g., Malkiel (2003), Nairn (2002), Shiller (2000).
4See DeMarzo, Kaniel and Kremer (2006) and Pastor and Veronesi (2006) for rational explanations of high
stock prices for new technologies.
1stocks; and (3) analysts’ optimistic forecasts have an impact on prices.5
We focus on the role of advisors and their communication process with investors in gen-
erating divergence of opinion and asset price bubbles. Building on the existing literature, we
assume that there are two types of investors, smart and naive, who are short sales constrained.
While smart investors recognize the heterogeneity in advisors, naive ones take whatever rec-
ommendations they receive at face value. Importantly, all advisors are well-intentioned in
that they care about the welfare of their advisees and want to honestly disclose their signals
to investors. We also assume that at times of technological innovation, only some advi-
sors understand the new technology (the tech-savvies); others do not and can only make
a downward-biased recommendation (the old-fogies). We also consider an alternative as-
sumption in which the old-fogies are replaced by dreamers who only issue upward-biased
recommendations. The divergence of opinion and price bias results do not depend on this as-
sumption but the old-fogey assumption is more theoretically interesting and there is evidence
that it is relevant at a minimum for the recent internet experience.6
A key contribution of our model is that it serves as a warning that even if a stock appears
over-valued, it may not be due to investors overreacting to news nor to sell-side bias. We
are not disclaiming the role of sell-side bias in the dot-com bubble—only that such bias is
not needed to generate asset price bubbles. Indeed, it is not clear that such bias can explain
bubbles that have occurred during earlier periods. We observe that during the dot-com
period, even so-called objective research ﬁrms with no investment-banking business, such as
Sanford and Bernstein, issued recommendations every bit as optimistic as investment banks
5See, e.g., Lin and McNichols (1998), Hong and Kubik (2003) for evidence on analyst incentives, Malmendier
and Shantikumar (2004) for evidence on investor reaction to recommendations and Michaely and Womack
(1999) for evidence on price impact.
6Throughout The Painted Word, from which our epigraph is drawn, Tom Wolfe describes the loss of
credibility suﬀered by art critics who were perceived as not ”getting” the new pop art movement of the late
ﬁfties. There is ample anecdotal evidence suggesting that advisors during the dot-com bubble faced similar
concerns. For instance, Stanley Druckenmiller, a self-confessed old economy dinosaur and value investor,
reversed course during the Internet boom period and declared that he understood the Internet after a meeting
with guru Andrew Grove (see Pacelle, 2000). Famous examples of old-fogies include Jonathan Cohen, a
sell-side analyst covering Internet stocks for Merrill Lynch who was ﬁred for his skeptical reports about the
Internet. In contrast, Mary Meeker, a vocal proponent of the Internet revolution, not only prospered during
the Internet era but continues to be an inﬂuential voice in technology even after the bursting of the bubble.
Finally, there also is evidence that young mutual fund managers were more aggressively holding technology
stocks during the dot-com bubble as compared to their older counterparts (see, e.g. Greenwood and Nagel,
2006).
2(see, e.g., Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy, 2003).7 This suggests that there must exist other
causes of upward biased forecasts by advisors aside from the sell-side incentives of analysts.
Moreover, we think of our model as applying more broadly to other advisors such as buy-side
analysts who are likely to be a more important part of the market. In short, our paper is
an exploration of an alternative and potentially more theoretically interesting mechanism for
generating divergence of opinion as opposed to simply assuming investors overreact to news
or are overly exuberant.
More speciﬁcally, we consider an economy with a single asset, which we call the new
technology stock. There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2. At date 0, advisors are randomly
matched with investors (the advisees). Advisors also observe the terminal payoﬀ (which is
realized at date 2) and can send signals about this payoﬀ to their advisees at date 0. A tech-
savvy can send whatever signal he wants, while an old-fogey, who does not understand the
new technology, is limited to a downward-biased signal. The investor type is unknown to the
advisor, and the advisor type is unknown to the investor. The advisor-investor relationship
is similar to that of a parent and teenaged child, in which the smart teenager is not sure
whether dad is cool, and the cool dad tries to impress his teenaged child because he wants
his child to heed his advice in the future.
At date 1, these advisors are randomly matched with a new set of investors. These
investors can invest in a separate risky project requiring an initial ﬁxed cost. Advisors
again receive information about this risky project, which pays oﬀ at date 2. Once again, a
tech-savvy can send whatever signal he wants, while an old-fogey is restricted to a downward-
biased signal. Each investor has access to the track record of his advisor, namely the signal
(or recommendation) that was sent by the latter at date 0. A smart investor can use this
information to update his belief about his advisor’s type.
To put this simple model into some context, think of the advisor at date 0 as a sell-side
analyst covering technology stocks, but (counterfactually) with only good intentions. Date
1 represents the future career opportunities of this analyst; for example, sell-side analysts
typically become advisors to hedge funds or corporations later in their careers. Importantly,
7Moreover, Grosyberg et al. (2005) ﬁnd that buy-side analysts (those working at mutual funds with-
out brokerage or investment banking relationships) issue even more optimistic forecasts than their sell-side
counterparts.
3what the advisor says at date 0 can be used for or against him at date 1. The updating of a
smart investor’s belief about his advisor’s type is a key driver of our model.
We ﬁrst consider the equilibrium at date 1. Because of uncertainty about advisor type,
smart investors may end up making investments when they should not, since they are not
sure whether a negative signal (i.e., a signal value less than the ﬁxed cost of investing) is
truly negative or if it just came from an old-fogey. We solve for a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium
in the reporting strategies of the advisors and the investment policies of the advisees. In
this equilibrium, tech-savvy advisors bias their signals downward over the set of states in
which it is not eﬃcient for the advisee to invest. By downwardly biasing their signals over
these states, the tech-savvy advisors lead the smart advisees to conclude that a certain set
of negative signals cannot be generated by tech-savvy advisors. This signaling enables smart
investors to avoid at least some ineﬃcient investments. However, it also imposes a dishonesty
cost upon the tech-savvy advisor, and this dishonesty cost is incurred per advisee.
As a result, the tech-savvy advisor has an incentive to establish a better reputation
at date 0 through his recommendation about the technology stock, since smart investors
subsequently will use his date 0 recommendation to update their beliefs on his type. The
stronger his reputation among smart investors becomes at date 1, the more easily he can
avoid dishonesty costs in inducing his advisees to make eﬃcient investments in that period.
This reputational incentive leads the tech-savvy advisor to inﬂate his forecasts to signal his
type to smart investors. We show that such a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium exists at date 0.
While smart advisees properly deﬂate this upward bias, naive investors unfortunately take
what the advisor says at face value.
We show that a price bubble can arise as a result of this signaling equilibrium. It is im-
portant to note that the assumption about heterogeneity in advisor types (tech-savvies versus
old-fogies) does not bias the results in our favor. To the contrary, this assumption, in com-
bination with our assumption of investor heterogeneity, would tend to produce a downward
bias in prices since naive investors take whatever old-fogies say at face value. In other words,
the eﬀect of optimistic signaling by well-intentioned tech-savvies has to be strong enough to
overcome this baseline downward bias. It is not clear ex ante that this need be the case.
However, we show that such a technology price bubble does exist when there is a suﬃcient
4number of naive investors guided by tech-savvy advisors.
To develop intuition for the price bias, let’s consider two polar cases. First, suppose
that there are only smart investors in the economy. In equilibrium, tech-savvy advisors will
tend to bias their forecasts upward so as to distinguish themselves from old-fogies. However,
smart investors understand this and in equilibrium will adjust their beliefs accordingly. In
this case, price will be an unbiased signal of fundamentals. Next, suppose that there are only
naive investors in the economy. In equilibrium, tech-savvy advisors will honestly disclose
their signals since they do not worry about the ability of naive investors to infer their type.
In this case, however, price will typically contain a downward bias due to the pessimistic
recommendations of old-fogies, which the naive investors take at face value.
When both types of investors are present in the economy, the price could be upwardly
biased. Tech-savvy advisors will bias their messages upward, and the extent of this bias in-
creases with the fraction of smart investors. While smart investors can de-bias these messages,
naive investors are unable to do so. Due to short sales constraints, the price is determined by
the marginal buyer and is not aﬀected by investors with a lower valuation. If the marginal
investor is a naive advisee of a tech-savvy, then price will be upwardly biased.
Our theory yields testable implications. For instance, unlike models such as Delong,
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), the degree of mispricing in our model is largest
when there are both sets of investors in the economy. Furthermore, we consider a number of
robustness issues. We show that our main results survive when we loosen two assumptions:
(1) allow old-fogies to send biased messages at a cost just like tech-savvies and (2) allow an
investor at date 0 to observe the recommendations of other advisors as well. We also consider
a number of extensions. In our model, smart investors are worried about unduely pessimistic
advisors. However, due to short sales constraints, our pricing results would survive even when
smart investors are worried about unduely optimistic advisors (dreamers). Importantly, our
results are robust to allowing for both dreamers and old-fogeys to simultaneously be in the
economy (see Section 3.3).
Our model is technically about a price bias and not about bubbles. We intentionally
neglect the key element of speculative trading (i.e., buying in anticipation of capital gain)
modelled elsewhere to keep things simple. But it is similar in spirit to models of speculative
5trading driven by heterogeneous beliefs and oﬀers an important new rationale for investor
divergence of opinion.
Our theory is related to the literature on costly signaling (see, e.g., Kreps, 1990; Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991). A key theme that this paper shares with earlier work is that concerns about
reputation can aﬀect the actions of agents who try to shape their reputations (Holmstrom
and Ricart i Costa, 1986; Holmstrom, 1999). Previous studies have shown that reputational
incentives can lead agents to take perverse actions, such as saying the expected thing which
may lead to information loss (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2006),
adopting a standard of conformist behavior (Bernheim, 1994) or making politically correct
statements so as to not look racist (Morris, 2001). More speciﬁcally, our model, similar to
Morris (2001) but unlike the others, emphasizes the perverse reputational incentives of a well-
intentioned advisor: in our model, the well-intentioned tech-savvy advisor engages in costly
signaling at date 0 so as to better help future investors. This contrasts with career-concerns-
based models such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990) in which the advisor does not know his
own type and engages in signal jamming to achieve a better reputation for his own personal
gain. Our work departs from the existing literature on reputational signaling by focusing on
the interaction of sophisticated agents (tech-savvies and smart investors) and naive agents
(old-fogies and naive investors), in a model that is geared toward examining implications for
asset pricing.
Finally, our paper complements interesting recent work by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) on
the disclosure strategies of ﬁrms when some of their investors have limited attention. Like us,
they emphasize the importance of introducing boundedly rational agents in understanding
the eﬀect of disclosures on asset prices. Unlike us, they focus on how the presentation of
information may lead to diﬀerent results with inattentive investors and the resulting incentives
of managers to potentially manipulate earnings to fool inattentive investors.
Our paper is organized as follows. We present the model and discuss related empirical
implications in Section 2. We consider robustness and extensions in Section 3. In Section
4, we conclude with a reinterpretation of the events of the Internet period in light of our
ﬁndings. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
62. Model
2.1. Set-up
We consider the pricing of a single traded asset, which we call the new technology or tech
stock. There are three dates, denoted by t = 0,1,2. The stock pays a liquidating dividend
at t = 2 given by
v = θ + , (1)
where θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], and  is normally distributed with a
mean of zero and a variance of σ2.
There are two types of advisors in the economy: those who are tech-savvy (with a mass of
π0 ∈ [0,1] in the population) and those who are old-fogies (with a remaining mass of 1−π0).
Advisor type is unknown to investors. Tech-savvy advisors observe θ (i.e., they understand
the new technology) and send a report to investors at t = 0, denoted by sTS
0 . We assume that
tech-savvy advisors are well-intentioned in two respects: they want to tell the truth, and they
also want to maximize the welfare of their advisees at t = 1. The truth-telling preference is
captured by an assumption that tech-savvies incur a dishonesty cost if they report a signal
diﬀerent from the truth. This cost is given by
c(sTS
0 − θ)2, (2)
where c > 0. As we shall see, a tech-savvy advisor may choose to incur some dishonesty
cost and strategically bias his report upward to improve the welfare of his future clients.8 In
contrast to the tech-savvy advisors, old-fogies do not understand the new technology and can
only send a report that is a downward-biased version of the truth. We assume that old-fogies
are not aware of their bias and truthfully report their common belief at t = 0:9
sOF
0 = aθ, (3)
8 For simplicity, we assume that tech-savvy advisors have a dishonesty cost at t = 0 instead of explicitly
incorporating the welfare of the advisees at t = 0. Our results remain when incorporating their welfare but
the conditions are less transparent.
9We will relax this assumption in Subsection 3.2 by allowing old-fogies to inﬂate their signals by incurring
a dishonesty cost. We will show that this extension does not aﬀect our main results.
7where a ∈ [0,1). Thus, the report sent by the old-fogies will always be a fraction of the true
value.
There are also two types of investors at t = 0: smart ones (with a mass of ρ ∈ [0,1] in
the population) and naive ones (with a remaining mass of 1 − ρ). Investor type is unknown
to advisors. Each investor is randomly matched with one advisor and only has access to
the report from this advisor.10 Smart investors are aware of the existence of old-fogies and
take into account the optimal reporting strategy of tech-savvy advisors in inferring their
advisors’ types from the messages sent by those advisors. Naive investors are not aware
of the heterogeneity in advisors and simply take the messages sent to them at their face
values.11 We assume that both smart and naive investors are risk neutral and take positions
to maximize their expected terminal wealth. We also assume that investors cannot short sell
shares and there is an upper bound to the number of shares an investor can hold, which we
denote by k.
At t = 1, the advisors are matched with a new set of investors. For simplicity, we assume
that these investors are risk neutral. Each of these investors has an opportunity to invest
in a diﬀerent risky (new technology) project. The ﬁxed cost of the project is I, which is a
constant between 0 and 1. The payoﬀ of the project is f, which is uniformly distributed on
the interval [0,1]. f is independent of θ. Tech-savvy advisors observe f and send a report to
investors at t = 1, denoted by sTS
1 . They continue to want to maximize the welfare of their
new advisees and incur a dishonesty cost per advisee of
c(sTS
1 − f)2, (4)
where c > 0, if their report diﬀers from the truth. Old-fogies again do not understand this
new technology, and they send a signal at t = 1 given by
sOF
1 = af, (5)
where a ∈ [0,1). We impose a parameter restriction that a ≥ I. This restriction ensures that
at least in some states of the economy an old-fogey advisor would advise investors to invest
10We will allow smart investors to access reports from other advisors in the extension to our main model
developed in Subsection 3.2.
11This assumption ﬁts with empirical evidence reported by Malmendier and Shantikumar (2004) about the
inability of individual investors to see through the incentives of sell-side analysts.
8in the project. In addition, we assume that each advisor at t = 1 is randomly matched with
n advisees. Advisor type is unknown to investors.
At t = 1, investors again will rely on the single advisor with whom they are matched in
deciding whether to make an investment. Investors only receive information about the past
reports (at t = 0) of the individual advisors with whom they are matched. Again, there are
two types of investors at t = 1. The smart investor uses the past report from his advisor to
update his belief at t = 1 about his advisor’s type, which we denote by π1. Naive investors
again just take whatever their advisors tell them at face value.
The motivation for the t = 1 set-up is that it is a reduced-form model meant to capture
a stream of future advising engagements in an advisor’s career. More speciﬁcally, one can
think of the advisor as a sell-side analyst at date 0 who becomes a consultant to hedge funds
or corporations on other projects later in his career (date 1). Those client institutions at
date 1 have information regarding his track record as a sell-side analyst. The parameter n
captures the number of such future advising engagements. For simplicity, we have assumed
that each advisor interacts with the same number of advisees at t = 1. More realistically,
advisors with better reputations, i.e. higher π1’s, would attract a larger number of advisees
at date 1. This would only help to strengthen our results.
2.2. Equilibrium at t = 1
We begin by deriving a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for the reporting strategy of the tech-savvy
advisors and the investment policies of investors at date 1. In characterizing this equilibrium,
we will take as given the following property of the date 0 equilibrium: π1, the probability
that the smart investor assigns to the tech-savvy advisor type at date 1, can only take three
values depending upon the report sent at t = 0: 0, πL (a constant) and 1. We will show
that this condition indeed characterizes the outcome from the game at t = 0 in the next
sub-section.
2.2.1. Smart investors have perfect information about advisor type: π1 = 1 or π1 = 0
We begin our analysis of the date 1 equilibrium with the case in which a smart investor knows
for sure whether his advisor is tech-savvy or an old-fogey. We will look for an equilibrium in
9which the tech-savvy advisor tells the truth and investors follow the eﬃcient investment rule
of investing when their expected values of f are greater than I (the ﬁxed cost of investing).
Proposition 1 Suppose that π1 = 1 or π1 = 0. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium at t = 1
consists of the following proﬁles. The tech-savvy advisor truthfully reports his information,
i.e. sTS
1 = f. The old-fogey reports sOF
1 = af by assumption. A smart investor is able to
deduce f from the message sent by his advisor, denoted by s1, and invests if f ≥ I and does










Figure 1: Advisors’ strategies at t = 1 when investors have perfect information about advisor
type. The solid line plots tech-savvy advisors’ strategy for diﬀerent values of f, while the
dashed line plots old-fogey advisors’ strategy.
Fig. 1 illustrates the reporting strategies of tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors. Let’s
check that this is indeed a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Given the reporting strategies of the
two types of advisors and the perfect information about advisor type, the smart investor can
deduce f and hence employs the eﬃcient investment rule: invest only if f ≥ I. His expected
gain is
E[max(f − I,0)] =
Z 1
I
(f − I)df =
1
2
(1 − I)2. (6)
10There is nothing to check for the naive investors since we assume that they always listen to
whatever message is sent and invest only if s1 ≥ I. They make an eﬃcient investment decision
if their advisor happens to be tech-savvy but may under-invest if their advisor happens to
be an old-fogey.
Given the investment strategies of the two types of investors, it is optimal for a tech-
savvy advisor to report the truth. He has nothing to gain from deviating from the truth
because the smart investor knows his type while the naive investor listens to whatever he
says. Furthermore, he would incur a dishonesty cost by lying. There is nothing to check for
old-fogies since we assume that they always report sOF
1 = af. We therefore have proven that
the proﬁles described in Proposition 1 constitute a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
2.2.2. Smart investors have imperfect information about advisor type: π1 = πL
When smart investors have imperfect information about advisor type at date 1, i.e. π1 =
πL, then a tech-savvy advisor has an incentive to report a downward-biased signal of f for
realizations of f that are neither extremely high nor extremely low. Since a smart investor
does not have perfect information about his advisor’s type, he will infer that signals less than
I may be sent by old-fogies in situations where f ≥ I, which could lead him to invest when he
should not. A tech-savvy advisor can alleviate this problem by discretely biasing his message
downward so as to communicate to a smart advisee that his message must be coming from a
tech-savvy advisor. In doing so, however, the tech-savvy advisor incurs some dishonesty cost
in equilibrium. As we will show in the next subsection, the date 1 dishonesty penalty creates
an incentive for a tech-savvy advisor to incur some initial dishonesty cost at t = 0 so as to
convince future investors of his type.
We begin by formally constructing the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the t = 1 sub-game
when π1 = πL.
Proposition 2 Suppose π1 = πL. A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium consists of the following






f if f ≥ f∗
bI if bI ≤ f < f∗










πL + (1 − πL)/a
< πL, (9)
and f∗ solves the equation
c(f∗ − bI)2 = ρ(I − f∗). (10)





(ρ/c − 2bI)2 + 4(ρI/c − b2I2) −
1
2
(ρ/c − 2bI), (11)
and bI < f∗ < I. The old-fogey reports sOF
1 = af by assumption. After observing a signal
s1 sent by his advisor, a smart investor will invest if s1 > bI and does not invest if s1 ≤ bI.
A naive investor invests if s1 ≥ I and does not invest if s1 < I.
I 













Figure 2: Advisors’ strategies at t = 1 when investors have imperfect information about
advisor type. The solid line plots tech-savvy advisors’ strategy for diﬀerent values of f, while
the dashed line plots old-fogey advisors’ strategy.
12The proof of this proposition is in the Appendix. Fig. 2 illustrates the tech-savvy advisor’s
reporting strategy described in Proposition 2. The tech-savvy advisor deﬂates his signal to
bI when the fundamental variable f is between bI and f∗ and truthfully reports his signal
when f is outside of this region. Note that (bI,I) is the region of fundamental value in which
smart investors might potentially confuse a truthful signal from a tech-savvy advisor with a
downward biased signal from an old-fogey advisor and make an inferior investment. To oﬀset
this identiﬁcation problem, the optimal reporting strategy is for the tech-savvy advisor to
downward bias his signal when f is between bIand f∗, where f∗ is a cut-oﬀ value given in
the proposition. Given the tech-savvy advisor’s reporting strategy, a smart investor advised
by the tech-savvy advisor avoids an inferior investment when f is between bI and f∗, but
still takes an inferior investment when f is between f∗ and I.
2.2.3. The gain from improved reputation for a tech-savvy advisor
Having characterized our Bayesian-Nash equilibrium across the varying states of informa-
tional completeness regarding advisor type, we now consider the value of the advisor’s rep-
utation from the perspective of a tech-savvy advisor. The advisor’s reputation will aﬀect
the investment strategy of smart investors but has no eﬀect on naive investors. If a tech-
savvy advisor has a perfect reputation, a smart investor’s welfare is given by the expression
R 1
I (f − I)df, which we presented earlier in equation (6). Accordingly, the value of a perfect




(f − I)df, (12)
which is proportional to the number of advisees he has and the probability that each one is
smart.
If the tech-savvy advisor has an imperfect reputation, the expected investment proﬁt to
a smart investor in our Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is
Z 1
f∗
(f − I)df, (13)
since the investor will end up investing when the signal is above f∗. With an imperfect repu-
tation, the tech-savvy advisor incurs a dishonesty cost in equilibrium when the fundamental




c(f − bI)2df. (14)
Since the tech-savvy advisor cares about both his own dishonesty cost and the smart investors’




(f − I)df −
Z f∗
bI
nc(f − bI)2df. (15)
Hence, the incremental gain to the tech-savvy advisor from establishing a perfect reputa-
tion is
V1 − V2 = nρ
Z I
f∗
(I − f)df +
Z f∗
bI
nc(f − bI)2df. (16)
The ﬁrst term represents a gain from preventing smart investors from making ineﬃcient
investments in inferior projects, and the second term represents a gain from avoiding the
dishonesty cost. We derive some simple comparative statics for this gain from a better
reputation.
Proposition 3 The tech-savvy advisor’s gain from improving his reputation, V1 − V2, in-
creases with the number of advisees (n) and the fraction of smart investors in the population
(ρ); and it decreases with the fraction of tech-savvy advisors (π0) and the degree to which
old-fogies behave like tech-savvies (a).
We relegate the proof of Proposition 3 to the Appendix since each of the comparative
statics results can be explained with simple intuition. First, as the number of advisees n at
t = 1 increases, the tech-savvy advisor has to incur more dishonesty costs. Hence, the greater
the number of future advisees, the larger is the gain to establishing a better reputation early
on. Similarly, having a better reputation only matters if there are smart investors around
to use it. The gain to a better reputation thus increases with ρ. On the other hand, the
better the initial reputation (π0), the less valuable is the gain from establishing a perfect
reputation, and hence we ﬁnd that V1 −V2 decreases in π0. Finally, the larger is a, the more
old-fogies behave like tech-savvies. As the diﬀerence between old-fogies and tech-savvies
14shrinks, investment decisions become more eﬃcient, and the gain to a tech-savvy advisor
from improving his reputation diminishes.
One way to think of the signalling game at t = 1 is that of an advisor (an analyst,
consultant, CEO) without a technology background who is hired by the board of directors
of a technology company to work with the company. A speciﬁc example is Louis Gertsner
who took over IBM in the early nineties and is often credited with saving it. Gerstner’s
previous posts had been American Express and RJR Nabisco. He often describes having
to face a skeptical IBM culture in his bid to turnaround IBM (see Gertsner, 2002). In the
context of our model, the advisees are the engineers of IBM who are uncertain about the
quality of Gertsner (whether he is a tech-savvy or an old-fogey). Gertsner had to talk the
IBM engineers out of a number of investments (or changes). His uncertain reputation means
that he had to exaggerate the extent to which he was against an investment to thwart it. As
a result, there is a reward to developing a reputation as a tech-savvy as this will help lower
the cost of having to exaggerate associated with being of an uncertain quality. This is a quite
general point that transcends the speciﬁc context of analysts or CEOs.12
2.3. Equilibrium at t = 0
2.3.1. Tech-savvy advisor’s reporting strategy
As we discussed earlier, it is potentially useful for a tech-savvy advisor with good intentions
to develop a good reputation among smart investors, since such a reputation would lessen
the extent of ineﬃcient investment by smart investors at t = 1 and also reduce the advisor’s
dishonesty cost in that period when he tries to minimize the investment ineﬃciency by biasing
his reports.
In this sub-section, we will construct a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium at t = 0 in which the
tech-savvy advisor biases his reports in an attempt to build a better reputation.
12Indeed, a second example that is less ﬁnancially related is a professor in a department who might be
thought of as being too tough (an old-fogey in terms of standards regarding hiring and not realizing that
times have changed and there are more jobs now). Hence, he has to be really negative to convince his
colleagues to not hire someone. A third example is a dad who might be thought of as being an old-fogey
by his kid. If the dad really wants the kid not to try something new, again he has to exaggerate and really
disapprove to convince his kid.
15Theorem 1 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium at t = 0 consists of the following proﬁles. The






θ if θ ≥ a
a if θ∗ < θ < a
θ if θ ≤ θ∗
(17)












An old-fogey reports sOF
0 by assumption. After observing a signal s0 sent by his advisor, a
smart investor infers the advisor’s type according to the following rule: if s0 ≥ a, the advisor
is tech-savvy for sure (π1 = 1); if θ∗ < s0 < a, the advisor is an old-fogey for sure (π1 = 0);
if s0 ≤ θ∗, the advisor’s type remains unclear, and his reputation as a tech-savvy advisor is
πL =
π0
π0 + (1 − π0)/a
, (19)
which is lower than the advisor’s initial reputation (π0).
a 
θ









Figure 3: Advisors’ strategies at t = 0. The solid line plots tech-savvy advisors’ strategy for
diﬀerent values of θ, while the dashed line plots old-fogey advisors’ strategy.
16Fig. 3 illustrates the tech-savvy advisor’s reporting strategy described in Theorem 1. We
now will conﬁrm that the strategy proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium. We begin by taking as
given the smart investor’s learning rule and verifying the optimality of a tech-savvy advisor’s
reporting strategy. First, suppose that θ > a. In this case, reporting the truth reveals the
tech-savvy advisor’s type since an old-fogey would never send such a signal. Since the tech-
savvy advisor thus can achieve a perfect reputation and induce eﬃcient investment while
incurring no dishonesty cost, it is optimal for him to tell the truth when θ > a. Now suppose
that θ ∈ [θ∗,a]. If θ is below a, the tech-savvy advisor can distinguish himself from an
old-fogey by inﬂating his signal to a, at a dishonesty cost of c(θ − a)2. Note that a tech-
savvy advisor would never partially inﬂate his report to a level below a, since it would hurt
his reputation in equilibrium given the smart investor’s learning rule. Since the dishonesty
cost increases quadratically with the degree of report inﬂation, as the fundamental value θ
decreases, the cost of inﬂating the report increases. When θ drops below a threshold level
given by θ∗, the dishonesty cost becomes too high relative to the gain from signaling that
one is a tech-savvy for sure. θ∗ is exactly determined by equation (18).
Finally, suppose that the fundamental value θ is below θ∗. In this case, as we have argued
above, it is too costly for the tech-savvy advisor to signal his type by inﬂating his message
to a. We also observe that partially inﬂating the signal would not improve the advisor’s
reputation at all. Hence, the advisor chooses to send a truthful signal.
Next, we verify the optimality of the smart investor’s inference rule, given the tech-savvy
advisor’s reporting strategy. If s0 ≥ a, the signal must come from a tech-savvy advisor,
since old-fogies would never report such a signal. Hence, π1 = 1. If s0 ∈ (θ∗,a), the signal
must come from an old-fogey, since tech-savvies would never report signals in this region. If
s0 ≤ θ∗, the signal could come from either a tech-savvy or an old-fogey. The probability it is
from a tech-savvy is given by Bayes Theorem:
Pr[tech-savvy|s0] =
λ(s0|tech-savvy)π0
λ(s0|tech-savvy)π0 + λ(s0|old-fogey)(1 − π0)
=
π0
π0 + (1 − π0)/a
, (20)
which is exactly πL deﬁned in equation (19). We also have veriﬁed our earlier claim about
the t = 0 equilibrium that we used to derive our t = 1 equilibrium, namely that π1 can only
17take on one of three values—0, 1, and πL.
The cut-oﬀ value θ∗ captures the degree to which the tech-savvy advisor biases his report
in order to build a better reputation. The lower is θ∗, the greater the bias. The bias is
maximal when θ∗ = 0, since this implies that the tech-savvy advisor reports a over the
entire interval [0,a). Thus, a − θ∗ can be interpreted as a measure of the upward bias in the
tech-savvy’s reporting strategy.
Proposition 4 The upward bias of the tech-savvy advisor’s reporting strategy (as measured
by a − θ∗) increases with the number of advisees at t = 1 (n) and the fraction of smart
investors (ρ), and decreases with the fraction of tech-savvy advisors (π0).
The intuition for these comparative statics is similar to that underlying the behavior of
V1 −V2, since the upward bias in the initial report is driven by the incentive to gain a better
reputation.
2.3.2. Asset price at t = 0
We now derive the equilibrium price of the tech stock at t = 0. An individual investor i, who
observes a signal si,0 from his advisor and takes the asset price p as given, chooses his asset
holding xi (shares) to maximize his expected ﬁnal wealth:
max
xi∈[0,k]
xi[Ei(θ|si,0) − p]. (21)
Note that the investor cannot short sell the asset and can only take a position smaller than
k.13 It is direct to solve the investor’s optimal position:
xi =
(
0 if Ei(θ|si,0) < p
k if Ei(θ|si,0) ≥ p
(22)
The investor will stay out of the market if the price is too high relative to his belief of the
asset fundamental and will take a maximum position k otherwise.
To derive the equilibrium asset price, we assume that the per capita supply of the asset is
¯ x shares. To make our discussion relevant, we require that k > ¯ x, i.e., investors in aggregate
can hold the net asset supply.
13We could also impose an upper bound on each investor’s position measured in dollars. This would slightly
complicate the notation, but would not aﬀect the qualitative results.
18Since each investor is paired with a single advisor, there are four possible types of investor-
advisor pairs: smart investors advised by tech-savvy advisors, smart investors advised by old-
fogey advisors, naive investors advised by tech-savvy advisors, and naive investors advised by
old-fogey advisors, in proportions of ρπ0, ρ(1−π0), (1−ρ)π0 and (1−ρ)(1−π0), respectively.
To simplify our discussion, we assume that there are enough investors of each of these four
pairs so that in aggregate any single combination can hold the net asset supply. As a result,
the equilibrium asset price is determined by the highest belief among these classes of investors.
We divide the derivation of the equilibrium asset price into the following three cases.
• Case 1: θ > a. In this case, tech-savvy advisors send a message equal to θ, while
old-fogey advisors send a message equal to aθ. After observing the message from their
advisors, smart investors, irrespective of the type of their advisors, will able to exactly
back out the true fundamental value θ. Naive investors advised by tech-savvy advisors
will believe the asset fundamental is θ, while those advised by old-fogey advisors will
believe the fundamental is aθ. Thus, the asset price is θ, which is unbiased.
• Case 2: θ ∈ [θ∗,a]. In this case, tech-savvy advisors send a message equal to a, while
old-fogey advisors send a message equal to aθ. Then, among the investors, naive ones
advised by tech-savvy advisors will hold the highest belief about the asset fundamental,
a. Thus,the asset price is a, with an upward bias that equals a − θ.
• Case 3: θ < θ∗. In this case, the equilibrium asset price is unbiased—given by θ. First
note that tech-savvy advisors send a message equal to θ, while old-fogey advisors send
a message equal to aθ. Then, naive investors advised by tech-savvy advisors believe
the asset fundamental is θ, while naive investors advised by old-fogey advisors believe
that it is aθ. Smart investors cannot exactly identify whether their advisors are tech-
savvy or old-fogey and will assign a probability πL, given in equation (19), to their
advisors as tech-savvy. Then, if a smart investor receives a message θ from his advisor,
he knows that the actual asset fundamental is either θ or θ/a, with probabilities of πL
and 1 − πL, respectively. However, this smart investor would not bid a price equal to
the expected asset fundamental, πLθ + (1 − πL)θ/a, because of the winner’s curse. If
the asset fundamental is θ/a, then naive investors advised by tech-savvy advisors would
19bid θ/a. Thus, if the smart investor bids πLθ +(1−πL)θ/a, he is cursed to receive the
asset because this implies that no one is bidding θ/a. Aware of this curse, any smart
investor receiving a message θ would only bid a price θ. Overall, the highest bid in the
market would be θ, and so is the asset price.
Summarizing the three cases discussed above, we obtain the following theorem regarding
the existence of a technology bubble.
Theorem 2 When there is a suﬃcient number of naive investors advised by tech-savvy ad-





θ if θ ≥ a
a if θ∗ < θ < a
θ if θ ≤ θ∗
. (23)
Thus, tech-savvy advisors’ message inﬂation would directly lead to a price bubble, i.e., the
asset price is upward biased by a − θ for asset fundamental θ between θ∗ and a.
2.4. Empirical Implications
In this subsection, we develop some testable implications of our model in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 5 The price bubble (bias) is maximized when there is a mix of naive and smart
investors. The recommendation bias on the part of the tech-savvy advisors increases with the
proportion of smart investors.
It is straightforward to prove this proposition. First note that when there are only smart
investors in the market, tech-savvy advisors would have the greatest incentive to signal their
type by inﬂating their signals, but smart investors understand this and will de-bias the signals
accordingly. Thus, there is no price bias on average. When there are only naive investors in
the market, tech-savvy advisors have no incentive to inﬂate their signals. As a result, there is
no price bias either. Taken together, the price bias is maximized when there is a mix of naive
and smart investors. Furthermore, the property of tech-savvy advisors’ recommendation bias
follows from Proposition 4.
20The ﬁrst prediction from Proposition 5 involves the relationship between price bias and
ρ. Suppose that we take the market-to-book ratio of a stock to be a proxy for over-valuation.
The caveat here is that the market-to-book ratio depends on risk and future returns. So
these other factors have to be controlled for to the extent possible. But lets assume that this
proxy picks up to some degree over-valuation and in addition that institutional investors are
smart and individual investors are naive. Then our model predicts that in a cross-section of
stocks, this ratio is non-linear in the heterogeneity of institutional and individual investors’
holdings in the stock. In other words, our model predicts that the market-to-book ratio will
be smaller when stock holders are exclusively retail or exclusively institutional and larger
when there is a mix of both. This strikes us as being a genuinely testable implication.
Nonetheless, this nonlinear pattern might also emerge in a standard asymmetric infor-
mation model in which institutional investors are (better) informed agents and individual
investors are uninformed (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). In this setting, the unconditional
equilibrium price is a non-linear function of the fraction of agents and in fact there are param-
eter values for which the pricing function is ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in the fraction
of informed agents.14 In other words, to distinguish between our model and alternatives, one
needs to simultaneously look at the second prediction from our comparative statics exercise
on ρ— that the recommendation bias is increasing in ρ. Using our previous interpretation
of institutional investors as smart and individual investors as naive, our model predicts that
we should see more optimistic recommendations issued by analysts on stocks in which the
investors are mostly institutional and less optimistic recommendations on stocks in which the
investors are mostly individuals.15
Ideally, we would obtain forecasts of buy-side analysts to conduct this test as we have
less conﬁdence in the prospects for testing this prediction using sell-side analyst data since
their incentives are known to be inﬂuenced by investment banking and trading commis-
sions. In other words, they do not have the purely good intentions as do the advisors in our
model. Unfortunately, buy-side analyst data is harder to come by than data for the sell-side.
Nonetheless, if one were to control for these oﬀsetting incentives to the greatest extent pos-
14We thank the referee for pointing this out to us.
15Here we are assuming that the distribution of advisor types is roughly the same across stocks of diﬀerent
characteristics.
21sible (perhaps by focusing on those sell-side analysts from purely objective research shops),
it would be interesting to see whether these two predictions simultaneously hold true in the
data.
We discuss below the case where investors are concerned about advisors being unduely
optimistic. We call such advisors dreamers. We show that if there are dreamers instead of old-
fogies, then the recommendation bias of tech-savvy decreases with ρ since tech-savvy advisors
will want to deﬂate their signals as we explain below. We think the old-fogey assumption
makes more sense for the Internet period. But in general, one could look at the relationship
between bias and the mix of investors to deduce which of these assumptions is valid.
3. Robustness
3.1. Other equilibria
In this paper, we construct an equilibrium at t = 0 in which a tech-savvy advisor biases his
message to a (or slightly above a) because there is no possibility that an old-fogey would
deliver such a message, given that an old-fogey’s message support is on the interval [0,a]
by assumption. Alternatively, one could attempt to construct an equilibrium in which the
tech-savvy advisor biases his message to some other value, say a0, where a0 < a. Such an
equilibrium would oﬀer the advantage of lowering the dishonesty cost incurred by the tech-
savvy type. Suppose that the tech-savvy advisor commits to reporting a0 for realizations
of fundamental value θ around a0. If smart investors know that only tech-savvy advisors
say a0 with a high probability, then tech-savvy advisors may be able to signal their type
more cost-eﬃciently. However, this type of equilibrium requires more public information or
coordination between tech-savvy advisors and smart investors than the one in which messages
are biased all the way up to a, or slightly higher than a. Indeed, biasing reports to slightly
above a is a natural strategy for signaling by tech-savvy advisors, since it arises naturally out
of the non-overlapping support of old-fogies and smart investors at a. The strategy of biasing
to a0 would require more public knowledge, e.g. via a pre-game announcement that a0 is a
focal message for tech-savvy advisors. Consequently, we focus on the equilibrium centered
on a, though we acknowledge the possibility of other equilibria requiring more pre-game
coordination.
223.2. Alternative assumptions
Our results depend on two assumptions. First, old-fogies always report a downward-biased
signal. Second, each investor at t = 0 only observes the message sent by his advisor. What
happens if old-fogies are allowed to send biased messages at a cost, just like tech-savvies?
And what if an investor at t = 0 can observe the recommendations of other advisors as well?
In this subsection, we extend our model to relax these two assumptions. This extension
yields several new insights. Notably, old-fogies want to bias their recommendations upwards
at t = 0. However, tech-savvies still can separate themselves from old-fogies by inﬂating
their recommendations to a level that is too costly for old-fogies to mimic. Such separation is
feasible when tech-savvies’ true beliefs are suﬃciently above those of old-fogies. Otherwise,
tech-savvies truthfully report their beliefs and are mimicked by old-fogies, resulting in a
pooling of the two types. Since naive investors take their advisors’ signals at face value, we
show that a bubble still can arise even when we relax these two key assumptions.
In order to solve the model in this more general setting, however, we need to make
additional assumptions related to the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs of market participants. While
we think these assumptions are reasonable, other equilibria could arise under alternative
assumptions about their oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs, as is commonly the case with Bayesian-Nash
equilibria. In this sense, our solution here is more fragile than that of our benchmark model.
We adopt the same set-up as in Section 2.1. At t = 0, both tech-savvy and old-fogey
advisors form their beliefs about a new technology θ. While the tech-savvies’ belief is correct
(ˆ θTS = θ), the old-fogies’ belief is biased downward (ˆ θOF = aθ). Both types of advisors
report signals to their advisees based on their beliefs. Extending our basic model, we assume
that old-fogies, like tech-savvies, can choose to bias their signals (recommendations) relative
to their own beliefs, subject to a dishonesty cost:
c(sOF
0 − ˆ θOF)2. (24)
In addition, we assume that at t = 0 there are many advisors in the market covering the
same technology stock, and their signals are observable not only to their advisees, but also to
other smart investors. Consequently, smart investors can compare signals from all advisors
to infer the asset fundamental θ. We assume that a naive investor continues to use only his
23advisor’s signal and accepts it at face value.
At t = 1, each advisor is matched with a new set of investors and assists them in deciding
whether to invest in a new project with random liquidation value f and ﬁxed cost I. We now
assume that both tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors can choose to bias their signals, subject
to the dishonesty cost, to maximize their advisees’ welfare based on their heterogenous beliefs.
As before, when a tech-savvy advisor with an imperfect reputation at t = 1 believes that the
project’s liquidation value f is below the cost I, smart investors might choose to invest in
the project even if the advisor truthfully reports his pessimistic belief. This is because smart
investors attribute a positive probability to the advisor being an old-fogey.
We now characterize our equilibrium solution of this extended model. At t = 1, the opti-
mal communication strategy on the part of a tech-savvy advisor with an imperfect reputation
(i.e. probability of being tech-savvy) π ∈ (0,1) is to bias his messages downward over some
beliefs so as to communicate to his smart advisee that certain messages could not be coming
from him. An old-fogey advisor with a reputation π ∈ (0,1) also has the same incentive to
deﬂate his recommendation over the same belief region.
Proposition 6 summarizes the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium at t = 1, with the proof given
in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium at t = 1 consists of the following proﬁles. The
reporting strategy of a tech-savvy advisor with a reputation of π ∈ [0,1] of being tech-savvy,
is
sTS
1 ( ˆ fTS) =

   
   
ˆ fTS if ˆ fTS ≥ f∗
dI if dI ≤ ˆ fTS < f∗
ˆ fTS if ˆ fTS < dI
(25)
where ˆ fTS is the advisor’s belief about the project fundamental f. The parameters f∗ and d
are determined by the following equations:
nρ(I − f∗) = nc(f∗ − dI)2 (26)
1
2




ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a
, with ˆ π =
π
π + (1 − π)/a
. (28)
The reporting strategy of an old-fogey advisor with reputation π is the same as that of a
tech-savvy advisor with the same reputation:
sOF
1 ( ˆ fOF) =

   
   
ˆ fOF if ˆ fOF ≥ f∗
dI if dI ≤ ˆ fOF < f∗
ˆ fOF if ˆ fOF < dI
(29)
where ˆ fOF is the advisor’s belief about the project fundamental f.
After observing the signal, a naive investor invests if and only if the signal is above I. A













Figure 4: Advisors’ strategies at t = 1 with imperfect information about type. The solid
line plots tech-savvy advisors’ strategy for diﬀerent values of f, while the dashed line plots
old-fogey advisors’ strategy.
Proposition 6 shows that tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors who possess the same rep-
utation and the same belief about the project fundamental will choose to report the same
signal, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The proof of Proposition 6 is standard and is given in the
25Appendix. We verify the optimality of advisors’ reporting strategies by taking the investors’
learning rules as given, and we subsequently verify the optimality of investors’ learning rules
by taking advisors’ reporting strategies as given. Since in equilibrium advisors do not report
signals in the region (dI,f∗), we need to specify an oﬀ-equilibrium belief for smart investors
if an advisor chooses to send a signal s1 ∈ (dI,f∗). In the proof, we assume that an investor
believes that such a signal could be from either a tech-savvy or an old-fogey with a belief
between s1 and f∗ and that the belief of each type of advisor is uniformly distributed on
(s1,f∗).16
According to Proposition 6, an imperfect reputation (π < 1) creates ineﬃciencies for
both types of advisors, as both tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors need to incur dishonesty
costs to avoid ineﬃcient investment by their smart advisees when the advisors’ beliefs are in
(dI,f∗). Furthermore, the smart advisee makes an ineﬃcient investment from the advisor’s
perspective if the advisor’s belief is in (f∗,I). Thus, for a benevolent tech-savvy advisor with
a reputation π, the expected ineﬃciency - equal to his dishonesty cost plus the investment




nρ(I − ˆ f)d ˆ f +
Z f∗
dI
nc( ˆ f − dI)2d ˆ f. (30)




nρ(I − ˆ f)d ˆ f/a +
Z f∗
dI
nc( ˆ f − dI)2d ˆ f/a. (31)
Note that
KOF(π) = KTS(π)/a. (32)
Based upon the expressions for KTS and KOF, we can directly verify that they are mono-
tonically decreasing with the advisor’s reputation π, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Both KTS(π) and KOF(π) decrease with π and are zero when π = 1.
Proposition 7 shows that both tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors can beneﬁt from a good
reputation. Thus, at t = 0, tech-savvy advisors have incentives to separate themselves from
16This assumption is reasonable because in the proposed equilibrium, no type of advisor ever inﬂates his
signal, but both types deﬂate their signals for some beliefs below f
∗. Hence, a signal in (dI,f
∗) could come
from an advisor who is attempting to deﬂate his signal but does not deﬂate it enough to the optimal level dI.
26old-fogey advisors by reporting an optimistic signal. At the same time, old-fogey advisors also
have the incentive to mix with tech-savvy advisors by inﬂating their signals as well. Due to
these incentives operating on both types, the equilibrium has two outcomes: (1) a separating
outcome in which tech-savvy advisors report an extremely optimistic signal that is too costly
for old-fogey advisors to match, when the fundamental is suﬃciently high; and (2) a pooling
outcome, in which tech-savvy advisors truthfully report their belief, and old-fogey advisors
match such a recommendation, when the fundamental is not too high.
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium, with the proof given in the Ap-
pendix.
Proposition 8 Under certain suﬃcient conditions, namely









KOF(0) − KOF(ˆ π) <
√
c(1 − a)/a (34)
where ˆ π = π0
π0+(1−π0)/a, we have the following Bayesian-Nash equilibrium at t = 0.
Given a tech-savvy advisor’s belief ˆ θTS, which is equal to the true value θ, his reporting
strategy is
sTS
0 (ˆ θTS) =
(
aˆ θTS + z if ˆ θTS ≥ θ∗











[KOF(0) − KOF(ˆ π)]/c. (37)
Given an old-fogey advisor’s belief ˆ θOF, which is equal to aθ, his reporting strategy is
sOF
0 (ˆ θOF) =
( ˆ θOF if ˆ θOF ≥ aθ∗
ˆ θOF/a if ˆ θOF < aθ∗.
(38)
A naive investor always takes the signal from his advisor at face value. When θ < θ∗,
the naive investor’s belief turns out to be correct; when θ ≥ θ∗, his belief is upward biased
27when he is matched with a tech-savvy advisor and downward biased when matched with an
old-fogey advisor.
Smart investors are always able to correctly infer the value of θ by comparing signals
available in the market. Furthermore, when θ ≥ θ∗, there is a separating outcome in which
tech-savvy advisors inﬂate their signal to aθ + z, while old-fogey advisors report aθ. Thus,
smart investors are able to identify their advisors’ types when θ is high. When θ < θ∗, there
is a pooling outcome in which all advisors send the same signal equal to θ. In this case, smart
investors attribute probability ˆ π = π0












Figure 5: Advisors’ strategies at t = 0. The solid line plots tech-savvy advisors’ strategy for
diﬀerent values of θ, while the dashed line plots old-fogey advisors’ strategy.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, Proposition 8 shows that when the technology fundamental θ is
suﬃciently high (θ ≥ θ∗), tech-savvy advisors are able to separate themselves from old-fogey
advisors by inﬂating their signal. It is too costly for old-fogey advisors to match the tech-
savvies’ signal because their belief is substantially below that of the tech-savvies. When θ is
small (θ < θ∗), tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors’ beliefs are close enough that it becomes
too costly for tech-savvy advisors to separate themselves, and consequently there is a pooling
equilibrium in which old-fogies inﬂate their signal to match the tech-savvies’ truthful report.
The proof of Proposition 8 is standard and is given in the Appendix. We again need
28to specify certain assumptions for investors’ learning rules when they receive oﬀ-equilibrium
signals. These assumptions are similar in spirit to those used to derive the equilibrium at
t = 1.
Because of the short sales constraints, the asset price at t = 0 is determined by the highest
belief in the market. When the asset fundamental θ is above θ∗, the belief of those naive
investors advised by tech-savvy advisors is upward biased to aθ + z. As a result, the asset
price is upward biased to aθ + z as well, as long as these investors in aggregate can hold the
net asset supply. When θ is below θ∗, every investor holds the correct belief, thus the asset
price is unbiased.
Proposition 9 When there is a suﬃcient number of naive investors advised by tech-savvy
advisors, the asset price at t = 0 is determined by
p =
(
aθ + z if θ > θ∗
θ if θ ≤ θ∗ (39)
The asset price is upward-biased when θ ≥ θ∗ and is unbiased otherwise.
3.3. Extensions
We consider a number of extensions to our model. The ﬁrst extension is to allow for inter-
mediate performance feedback. In our current model, the advisors are not judged on the
accuracy of their recommendations at t = 0. We can extend our model to allow for this
feedback. This feedback would weaken the incentive of the tech-savvy advisors to signal their
type, but the key results would not be overturned. As is the case with any type of signaling
model, we also could allow advisors to signal in other ways besides through their recommen-
dations. While the advisor might trade oﬀ diﬀerent modes of signaling, the basic insights of
the model would remain unchanged.
The second extension is to replace old-fogies with dreamers, advisors who are instead
unduely optimistic. The model in this case is completely symmetric to our original set-up
except that tech-savvies deﬂate their signal to separate themselves from dreamers. However,
despite tech-savvy advisors’ signal deﬂation, the asset price would still be upward biased
as long as there are enough naive investors guided by dreamers. Although smart investors
29recognize the overvaluation, they can only sit on the sideline because of the short sales
constraints. We omit the analysis of this case as it is subsumed by our next extension.
The third extension is to consider the equilibrium when there are both dreamer and old-
fogey advisors in the economy. Namely, we derive the equilibrium at t=0 when there are
both dreamers and old-fogies in the market, i.e. there are three type, dreamers, old-fogies
and tech-savvies. The upshot is that we are able to show that there is an equilibrium with
properties qualitatively similar to those in the paper and hence that our results will not fall
apart with three types in the market.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that dreamers can only send an upward-biased signal about
the new technology at t = 0:
sDR
0 = b + (1 − b)θ (40)
where b ∈ (0,1). Note that as b increases, the dreamers’ signal becomes more optimistic. As
before, old-fogies can only send a downward-biased signal:
sOF
0 = aθ, (41)
where a ∈ [0,1). Tech-savvies have a correct belief about θ, but can choose to bias their
reports for the purpose of signalling. We denote the initial distribution of the three types of
advisors, dreamers, old-fogies, and tech-savvies, by πDR, πOF, and πTS, respectively (πDR +
πOF + πTS = 1).
It is diﬃcult to analyze the tech-savvies’ reporting strategy in the most general case.
Instead, we focus on the case where dreamers’ and old-fogies’ signal spaces do not overlap,
i.e., the highest possible report from an old-fogey is still lower than the lowest possible
message from a dreamer, b > a. We need this assumption of non-overlapping signal spaces
for tractability.
For brevity, we focus on the t = 0 equilibrium and the reporting strategy of tech-savvies
during this period. We make some reduced form assumptions regarding the advisor’s contin-
uation value function at t = 1. Given the non-overlapping signal spaces, there are only three
possible outcomes regarding a tech-savvy’s reputation at t = 1 in equilibrium. The ﬁrst is
that he has a perfect reputation as a tech-savvy. We denote his value function in this case
30by VTS. The second is that he has an imperfect reputation as a possible old-fogey but is
for sure not a dreamer. We denote his value function in this case by VOF(π) with π as the
probability that smart investors assign to him as a tech-savvy. The third is that he has an
imperfect reputation as a possible dreamer but is for sure not an old-fogey. We denote his
value function in this case VDR(π) with π as the probability that smart investors assign to
him as a tech-savvy. It is natural to assume that both VOF(π) and VDR(π) increase with π
and are always less than VTS. Otherwise, there would be not value of signalling at t = 0.
Like before, we assume that if the tech-savvy biases his report, he suﬀers a dishonesty cost:
c(sTS
1 − θ)2.
The equilibrium at t = 0 is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium at t = 0 consists of the following proﬁles. The




        
        
θ if θ ≥ θ∗
2
b if b ≤ θ < θ∗
2
θ if a ≤ θ < b
a if θ∗
1 ≤ θ < a
θ if θ < a
(42)
where θ∗















































After observing a signal s0 sent by his advisor, a smart investor infers the advisor’s type
according to the following rule: if s0 ≥ θ∗
2, the advisor can either be a tech-savvy with a
probability of πTS
πTS+πDR/(1−b) or a dreamer with a probability of
πDR/(1−b)
πTS+πDR/(1−b); if b < s0 < θ∗
2,
the advisor is a dreamer for sure; if a ≤ s0 ≤ b, the advisor is a tech-savvy for sure; if
31θ∗
1 ≤ s0 < a, the advisor is an old-fogey for sure; ﬁnally, if s0 ≤ θ∗
1, the advisor can either be
a tech-savvy with a probability of πTS


















Figure 6: Advisors’ strategies at t = 0 in the presence of dreamers and old-fogies. The solid
line plots tech-savvy advisors’ strategy for diﬀerent values of θ, the top dashed line plots
dreamer advisors’ strategy, while the bottom dashed line plots old-fogey advisors’ strategy.
Fig. 6 illustrates a tech-savvy’s reporting strategies at t = 0 in the presence of dreamers
and old-fogies. Note that for high (but not too high) realizations of the fundamental, θ ∈
(b,θ∗
2), the tech-savvy advisor deﬂates his report to b. Intuitively, he is worried about being
pooled with dreamers in this region. And for low (but not too low) realizations of the
fundamental, θ ∈ (θ∗
1,a), the tech-savvy advisor inﬂates his report to a. He is worried about
being pooled with old-fogies in this region.
The following proposition further shows that the tech-savvy’s tendency to bias his report
depends on the ex ante distribution of advisors. More speciﬁcally, when investors are more
concerned about their advisors being an old-fogey (i.e. πOF is higher), the tech-savvy inﬂates
his report for a larger range of fundamental values (i.e. a−θ∗
1 is bigger); while when investors
are more concerned about their advisors being a dreamer (i.e. πDR is higher), the tech-savvy
deﬂates his reports for a larger range of fundamental values (i.e. θ∗
2 − b is bigger).
32Proposition 10 Keeping πTS constant, an increase in πOF (which corresponds to a decrease
in πDR for the probabilities to sum up to one) would cause a − θ∗
1 to rise and θ∗
2 − b to fall.
Thus, our results remain with three types of advisors in the market in the sense that
there is more inﬂation when there is more concern about old-fogies and less inﬂation or
deﬂation when there is more concern about dreamers. Importantly, since there are short-
sales constraints, there will be an upward price bias and the bias is greater when there is
more concern about old-fogies.
4. Conclusion
We conclude by re-interpreting the events of the Internet period in light of our model. In the
aftermath of the Internet bubble, many have cited the role of biased advisors in manipulating
the expectations of naive investors. We agree with the focus on the role of advisors but observe
that there is something deeper in the communication process between advisors and investors
that can lead to an upward bias in prices during times of excitement about new technologies,
even absent any explicit incentives on the part of analysts to sell stocks.
Our model suggests that the Internet period was a time when investors were naturally
concerned about whether their advisors understood the new technology, i.e. were their ad-
visors old-fogies or tech-savvy? Investors do not want to listen to old-fogies. As a result,
well-intentioned advisors have an incentive to signal that they are tech-savvy by issuing opti-
mistic forecasts, and this incentive is based on their desire to be listened to by future advisees.
Unfortunately, naive investors do not understand the incentives of advisors to inﬂate their
forecasts, and consequently asset prices are biased upward.
This view is not totally without empirical support. In addition to the evidence cited in
the introduction, it is well known that the reports issued by sell-side analysts are typically
read only by institutional investors, who for the most part do a good job of de-biasing analyst
recommendations. Unfortunately, during the Internet period, many retail investors took the
positive, upbeat recommendations of analysts a bit too literally. Again, this is not to say
that analysts during this period were solely well-intentioned, but simply that when there are
naive investors, there can be a bubble during times of technological excitement even if all
33analysts are well-intentioned.
5. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Proposition 2
To verify that the proposed strategies indeed constitute a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, we
begin by taking as given the reporting strategies of the advisors and verifying the optimality
of the smart investor’s investment policy. First, suppose that s1 ≥ I. The message could be
from a tech-savvy or an old-fogey (if s1 ∈ [I,a]). In this case, however, it does not matter to
the smart investor which type of advisor sent such a signal, since the investor will infer that
f ≥ I given the reporting strategies of the two types of advisors. Thus, the investor invests
when s1 ≥ I.
Next, let’s suppose that s1 ∈ (f∗,I). For a signal sent in this region of the support, the
signal again could be from a tech-savvy or an old-fogey. Let πLL be the posterior probability
that a signal in this region came from a tech-savvy advisor, i.e.
πLL = Pr{tech-savvy|s1} (45)
with s1 ∈ (f∗,I). Then by Bayes Theorem, we have that
πLL =
λ(s1|tech-savvy)πL
λ(s1|tech-savvy)πL + λ(s1|old-fogey)(1 − πL)
, (46)
where λ denotes a probability density function. Given the tech-savvy advisor’s reporting





1 if f ∈ [0,bI)
0 if f ∈ (bI,f∗)
1 if f ∈ [f∗,1]
(47)
and Pr(s1 = bI|tech-savvy) = f∗ − bI. Note also that since the signal from an old-fogey has
uniform distribution over the interval [0,a],
λ(s1|old-fogey) = 1/a, ∀ s1 ∈ [0,a]. (48)
Thus, if s1 ∈ (f∗,I), then
πLL =
πL
πL + (1 − πL)/a
< πL. (49)
34Given such a signal, the smart investor’s inference of the project fundamental is
E[f|s1] = πLLs1 + (1 − πLL)s1/a. (50)
Thus, the investor ﬁnds it optimal to invest in the project if
s1 >
I
πLL + (1 − πLL)/a
= bI. (51)
Now suppose that s1 ∈ (bI,f∗]. In this case, the smart investor deduces that the signal
must be from an old-fogey since a tech-savvy advisor would never send a signal in this region.
Given such a signal, the smart investor’s inference of the project fundamental is





1 − (1 − a)πLL
> I. (52)
The smart investor therefore invests when s1 ∈ (bI,f∗].
If s1 = bI, then the signal must be from a tech-savvy advisor since the reporting strategy
of that type puts non-trivial mass on the signal bI. To see this, note that
Pr{s1 = bI|tech-savvy} = f∗ − bI, (53)
and












Pr(s1 = bI|tech-savvy)πL + Pr(s1 = bI|old-fogey)(1 − πL)
= 1 (55)
Given such an inference, the smart investor would not invest.
If s1 < bI, then the analysis is similar to the case in which s1 ∈ (f∗,I). πLL again is the
posterior probability that a signal in this region came from a tech-savvy advisor. Given such





In this case, s1 < bI, so the smart investors do not invest. We thus have shown that the
postulated investment policy of the smart investors is indeed optimal given the proposed
35reporting strategy of the tech-savvy advisors and the assumed reporting strategy of the old-
fogies.
We now will show that the tech-savvy advisor’s reporting strategy is optimal given the
investors’ investment policies. Suppose that f ≥ I, so that it is eﬃcient for investors to invest.
Then it is optimal for the tech-savvy advisor to tell the truth. Suppose that f ∈ (f∗,I). In
this case, investment is not eﬃcient. Under the proposed strategy of smart investors, however,
those investors will invest after observing a signal in this range. If the advisor tells the truth,
then the expected cost born by smart investors is nρ(I − f). If the advisor were to bias his
message, he would have to deﬂate it to bI to prevent smart investors from investing according
to the proposed investment rule. The dishonesty cost of deﬂating the message to bI across n
advisees is
nc(f − bI)2. (57)
Since f > f∗, we ﬁnd that
nc(f − bI)2 > nc(f∗ − bI)2 = nρ(I − f∗) > nρ(I − f) (58)
using the deﬁnition of f∗ given in the proposition above. As a result, there is no incentive
for a tech-savvy advisor to under-report his signal in order to dissuade smart investors from
investing.
Suppose that f ∈ [bI,f∗]. Under the proposed equilibrium strategies, the smart investor
would not invest in this range of f, and the tech-savvy advisor incurs a dishonesty cost of
nc(f − bI)2. The tech-savvy advisor will not deviate to any signal lower than bI, since this
would increase his dishonesty cost while having no eﬀect on the smart investor’s decision. If
the advisor deviates to any signal s1 > bI, this would induce the smart investor to invest,
and the cost to smart investors again would be given by nρ(I −f). If the advisor reports bI,
then the dishonesty cost incurred by the advisor is nc(f −bI)2. Note that when f ∈ [bI,f∗],
nc(f − bI)2 ≤ nc(f∗ − bI)2 = nρ(I − f∗) ≤ nρ(I − f), (59)
again from the deﬁnition of f∗. Thus, it is optimal for the tech-savvy advisor to report bI
when f ∈ [bI,f∗], since the cost of ineﬃcient investment by smart investors outweighs the
36maximum reduction of dishonesty cost that the tech-savvy advisor could achieve by telling
the truth.
Finally, if f < bI, then the advisor simply tells the truth since a truthful signal will lead
investors to make the eﬃcient decision to not invest.
5.2. Proof of Proposition 3
By integrating Eq. (16), we have
V1 − V2 =
nρ
2
(I − f∗)2 +
nc
3
(f∗ − bI)3. (60)
By substituting in Eq. (10), we can transform the last Eq. into













This equation directly implies that V1 − V2 increases with ρ and decreases with f∗.
Eq. (10) implies that f∗ increases with b. Eq. (8) implies that b increases with πLL,
which also increases with π0. Thus, f∗ increases with π0, and V1 −V2 decreases with π0. Eq.
(8) also implies that b increases with a; therefore, f∗ increases with a, and V1 −V2 decreases
with a.
5.3. Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 3 implies that the gain from a good reputation, V1 − V2, increases with n and ρ,
and it decreases with π0. Then, Eq. (18) implies that θ∗ (weakly) decreases with n and ρ,
and it (weakly) increases with π0.
5.4. Proof of Proposition 6
First, taking as given the tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors’ reporting strategies, we verify
the optimality of the smart investors’ investment rule based on the realization of s1.
1. s1 ∈ (a,1]. This signal must be from a tech-savvy advisor, and the investment project’s
payoﬀ f = s1 ≥ a ≥ I. Therefore, it is optimal for the smart investor to invest in the
project.
372. s1 ∈ [f∗,a]. This signal could be from a tech-savvy or an old-fogey. Given the prior
probability π that the advisor is tech-savvy, the updated probability is ˆ π = π
π+(1−π)/a.
Accordingly, the expected project payoﬀ is
E{f|s1 ∈ [f∗,a]} = ˆ πs1 + (1 − ˆ π)s1/a = s1/b(π) =
2s1
f∗ + dI
I > I. (62)
Hence the smart investor invests.
3. s1 ∈ (dI,f∗). Since neither tech-savvies nor old-fogies report signals in this range in
equilibrium, we need to specify a certain oﬀ-equilibrium belief for the investor in order
to derive her investment decision. We assume that after receiving a signal in (dI,f∗),
the investor believes that the signal could be from either a tech-savvy or an old-fogey
with a belief between s1 and f∗. We further assume that the smart investor views
the belief of each type of advisor to be uniformly distributed on (s1,f∗). Under these
assumptions, the smart investor’s updated expectation of the project payoﬀ is
E[f|s1 ∈ (dI,f∗)] = [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]
(s1 + f∗)
2
> [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]
(dI + f∗)
2
= [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]b(π)I
= I. (63)
Consequently, the smart investor would choose to invest.
4. s1 = dI. Such a signal could be from either a tech-savvy or an old-fogey advisor with a
belief between dI and f∗. Given the prior probability π that the advisor is tech-savvy,
the smart investor’s updated probability is ˆ π. Then since advisors’ beliefs are uniformly
distributed, the smart investor’s expectation of the project payoﬀ is
E[f|s1 = dI] = [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]
(dI + f∗)
2
= [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]b(π)I
= I. (64)
Hence, the investor is indiﬀerent between investing and not investing.
385. s1 ∈ [0,dI). Such a signal could be a truthful signal from either a tech-savvy or an
old-fogey. The smart investor’s expectation of the project payoﬀ is
E[f|s1] = [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]s1
< [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]dI
< [ˆ π + (1 − ˆ π)/a]b(π)I
= I. (65)
Accordingly, the investor chooses not to invest.
Next, taking the smart investor’s investment strategy as given, we derive the optimal
reporting strategies for both the tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors. Both types of advisors
want to maximize their advisees’ investment proﬁts and simultaneously minimize their dis-
honesty costs. Given this common objective, tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors have the same
optimal reporting strategy. Therefore, in the proof below, we do not diﬀerentiate them. We
denote ˆ f as a given advisor’s belief about the project fundamental. Based on the realization
of ˆ f, we have the following cases.
1. ˆ f > I. The advisor will truthfully report her belief, because it is optimal to invest in
the project, and all investors will do so after receiving a truthful signal.
2. ˆ f ∈ [f∗,I). The advisor believes that it is ineﬃcient to invest in the project. If
she truthfully reports her belief in the signal, a naive advisee will take the signal at
face value and will choose not to invest. However, a smart advisee cannot distinguish
whether the signal is from a tech-savvy or old-fogey advisor and will choose to invest
according to his investment strategy. The advisor can prevent the ineﬃcient investment
by her smart advisees by deﬂating the signal to dI. In doing so, the advisor has to incur
a dishonesty cost of
nc( ˆ f − dI)2 ≥ nc(f∗ − dI)2 = nρ(I − f∗) > nρ(I − ˆ f), (66)
where the last expression equals the total investment losses that would be incurred by
her smart advisees if the advisor reports truthfully. Since the dishonesty cost outweighs
39the avoided investment losses, it is not optimal for the advisor to deﬂate her signal to
dI. It also is not optimal to deﬂate her signal to a level higher than dI, since a smart
advisee still would invest after observing such a signal. Hence, the advisor will truthfully
report her belief.
3. ˆ f ∈ (dI,f∗). Similar to the previous case, the advisor believes that it is ineﬃcient
to invest in the project and faces the dilemma that her smart advisees would choose
to invest after observing a truthful signal from her. To avoid this outcome, it now is
optimal for the advisor to deﬂate her signal to dI, since her dishonesty cost is smaller
than her smart advisees’ potential investment losses:
nc( ˆ f − dI)2 < nc(f∗ − dI)2 = nρ(I − f∗) < nρ(I − ˆ f). (67)
Again, note that the advisor will not deﬂate her signal to a level higher than dI since
her smart advisees still would choose to invest after receiving such a signal. Hence, it
is optimal for the advisor to deﬂate her signal to dI.
4. ˆ f ∈ [0,dI]. The advisor will truthfully report her belief, since the advisor regards the
project as inferior, and all her advisees will avoid the project after receiving a truthful
signal.
5.5. Proof of Proposition 8
Taking the advisors’ reporting strategies as given, it is straightforward to verify the optimality
of the smart investors’ learning rule. Accordingly, we will focus on the verifying the optimality
of an individual advisor’s reporting strategy, taking the smart investors’ learning rule and
other advisors’ reporting strategies as given.
First, we verify the optimality of a tech-savvy advisor’s reporting strategy. Depending on
the realization of her belief ˆ θTS, which is equal to θ, we have the following cases.
1. ˆ θTS ∈ [θ∗,1]. The advisor knows that other tech-savvy advisors share her belief and will
report signals equal to aˆ θTS + z, and that old-fogey advisors will report signals equal
to their belief, aˆ θTS. The advisor can choose to inﬂate her signal to aˆ θTS + z, just
like other tech-savvies, and thus obtain a perfect reputation among smart investors.
40The investor also could truthfully report her belief or inﬂate her signal to a level lower
than aˆ θTS +z. (Note that there are no incentives for the advisor to deﬂate her signal.)
Since these alternative signals do not appear in equilibrium, we need to specify an oﬀ-
equilibrium belief for smart investors in order to evaluate the advisor’s optimal choice.
We assume that if smart investors receive a signal in the region [ˆ θTS,aˆ θTS + z), they
believe the signal could be from either tech-savvies or old-fogies, and therefore assign
the sender the probability ˆ π = π0
π0+(1−π0)/a of being tech-savvy. Given the investors’
learning rule, the feasible choices for the advisor are to truthfully report her belief or
to inﬂate the signal to aˆ θTS + z, which generate reputations of ˆ π and 1, respectively.
The beneﬁt of inﬂating the signal is KTS(ˆ π)−KTS(1) = KTS(ˆ π). The dishonesty cost
of inﬂating the signal is
c(aˆ θTS + z − ˆ θTS)2 = c[z − (1 − a)ˆ θTS]2. (68)
When ˆ θTS > θ∗, the inequality conditions in (34) imply that the dishonesty cost is less
than KTS(ˆ π). Thus, the advisor’s optimal strategy is to inﬂate the signal to aˆ θTS + z.
2. ˆ θTS ∈ [0,θ∗). In this region, tech-savvy and old-fogey advisors’ signals are pooled at the
same level ˆ θTS. To verify the optimality of a tech-savvy advisor’s strategy, we assume
that if an advisor sends a signal above or equal to ˆ θTS, smart investors assign her a
probability ˆ π of being tech-savvy; and if the advisor sends a signal below ˆ θTS, smart
investors assign her a probability zero of being tech-savvy. It then directly follows from
these assumptions that a tech-savvy advisor’s optimal choice is to truthfully report her
belief.
Next, we verify the optimality of an old-fogey advisor’s reporting strategy. Depending
upon the realization of the advisor’s belief ˆ θOF, which is equal to aθ, we have the following
cases.
1. ˆ θOF ∈ [aθ∗,a]. The advisor knows that other old-fogey advisors will report their belief
ˆ θOF, while tech-savvy advisors will report ˆ θOF +z. We need to show that the advisor’s
optimal choice is to truthfully report her belief and thus be identiﬁed as an old-fogey.
She could choose to inﬂate her signal to ˆ θOF + z and thus be identiﬁed as tech-savvy.
41The dishonesty cost that she would incur is cz2, while the beneﬁt is KOF(0), which
is exactly cz2 by construction of z in Proposition 8. Hence, the advisor is indiﬀerent
between truthfully reporting her belief or inﬂating the signal to ˆ θOF+z. The advisor also
could inﬂate her signal to a level in [ˆ θOF/a, ˆ θOF + z). In equilibrium, no one actually
sends a signal in this region. Given our earlier assumption about smart investors’
oﬀ-equilibrium that they assign the sender a probability ˆ π of being tech-savvy upon
receiving a signal in this region, the advisor would only inﬂate the signal to ˆ θOF/a,
the minimum level needed to obtain the partial reputation ˆ π as a tech-savvy. The
dishonesty cost incurred is
c(ˆ θOF/a − ˆ θOF)2 = c
(1 − a)2
a2
ˆ θOF2 ≥ KOF(0) − KOF(ˆ π), ∀ ˆ θOF > θ∗. (69)
Since KOF(0) − KOF(ˆ π) is the beneﬁt of inﬂating the signal, it is not optimal for the
advisor to do so when her belief is above θ∗. Also note that the advisor would never
choose to inﬂate her signal to a level lower than ˆ θOF/a, because a tech-savvy advisor
would never send out a signal in this region. Therefore, truthfully reporting the belief
ˆ θOF is an optimal choice.
2. ˆ θOF ∈ [0,aθ∗). The old-fogey advisor has two feasible choices. She can either obtain a
reputation ˆ π by inﬂating her signal to ˆ θOF/a, or she can identify herself as an old-fogey
by reporting her true belief ˆ θOF. Since the cost of inﬂating the signal




≤ KOF(0) − KOF(ˆ π), ∀ ˆ θOF ≤ θ∗, (70)
the advisor’s optimal choice is to inﬂate the signal.
5.6. Proof of Theorem 3
We begin by taking as given the smart investor’s learning rule and verifying the optimality
of a tech-savvy’s reporting strategy, according to the following cases:
• First, suppose that θ ∈ (a,b). In this case, reporting the truth reveals the tech-savvy’s
type since neither an old-fogey nor a dreamer would ever send such a signal. The tech-
savvy thus can achieve a perfect reputation while incurring no dishonesty cost, it is
optimal for him to tell the truth when θ ∈ (a,b).
42• Now, suppose that θ ∈ [θ∗
1,a]. In this case, the tech-savvy does not need to be worried
about being identiﬁed as a dreamer since a dreamer will never report a signal in this
region. However, an old-fogey might. If θ is below a, the tech-savvy can distinguish
himself from an old-fogey by inﬂating his signal to a, at a dishonesty cost of c(θ − a)2.
Note that a tech-savvy would never partially inﬂate his report to a level below a, since it
would hurt his reputation given the smart investor’s learning rule. Since the dishonesty
cost increases quadratically with the degree of report inﬂation, as the fundamental
value θ decreases, the cost of inﬂating the report increases. When θ drops below a
threshold level given by θ∗
1, the dishonesty cost becomes too high relative to the gain
from signaling that one is a tech-savvy for sure. θ∗
1 is exactly determined by Eq. (43).
• Then, suppose that the fundamental value θ is below θ∗
1. In this case, as we have argued
above, it is too costly for the tech-savvy to signal his type by inﬂating his message to
a. We also observe that partially inﬂating the signal would not improve the advisor’s
reputation at all. Hence, the advisor chooses to send a truthful signal.
• Next, suppose that θ ∈ [b,θ∗
2]. In this case, the tech-savvy does not need to be worried
about being identiﬁed as an old-fogey since an old-fogey will never report a signal in
this region. However, a dreamer might. If θ is above b, the tech-savvy can distinguish
himself from a dreamer by deﬂating his signal to b, at a dishonesty cost of c(θ − b)2.
Note that a tech-savvy would never partially deﬂate his report to a level above b, since it
would hurt his reputation given the smart investor’s learning rule. Since the dishonesty
cost increases quadratically with the degree of report deﬂation, as the fundamental
value θ increases, the cost of deﬂating the report increases. When θ rises above a
threshold level given by θ∗
2, the dishonesty cost becomes too high relative to the gain
from signaling that one is a tech-savvy for sure. θ∗
2 is exactly determined by Eq. (44).
• Finally, suppose that the fundamental value θ is above θ∗
2. In this case, as we have
argued above, it is too costly for the tech-savvy to signal his type by deﬂating his
message to b. We also observe that partially deﬂating the signal would not improve the
advisor’s reputation at all. Hence, the advisor chooses to send a truthful signal.
43Next, we verify the optimality of the smart investor’s inference rule, given the tech-savvy’s
reporting strategy.
• If s0 ∈ [a,b], the signal must come from a tech-savvy, since neither old-fogies nor
dreamers would report such a signal.
• If s0 ∈ (θ∗
1,a), the signal must come from an old-fogey, since neither tech-savvies nor
dreamers would report signals in this region.
• If s0 ≤ θ∗
1, the signal could come from either a tech-savvy or an old-fogey, and the








Consequently, the probability that the signal comes from an old-fogey is
πOF/a
πTS+πOF/a.
• If s0 ∈ (b,θ∗
2), the signal must come from a dreamer, since neither tech-savvies nor
old-fogies would report signals in this region.
• If s0 ≥ θ∗
2, the signal could come from either a tech-savvy or a dreamer, and the






πTS + πDR/(1 − b)
. (72)
Consequently, the probability that the signal comes from a dreamer is
πDR/(1−b)
πTS+πDR/(1−b).
5.7. Proof of Proposition 10
It is direct to see that πTS






to increase since VOF(·) is a monotonically increasing function.
Consequently, θ∗
1 would decrease with πOF, as implied by Eq. (43). Similarly, we can prove
that θ∗
2 increases with πDR, using Eq. (44).
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